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  Is the Law an Asset? 
 
Is The Law An Asset 
 
Thomas Power1, Fiacra McDonnell2  
 
 
This paper reviews US environmental policy as articulated in various Enactments 
since 1955, and to deal briefly with the interaction between national and state 
regulators which arises from the special constitutional relationship between them. It 
presents and explains the main features of environmental legislation in the USA. and 
investigates how experience has justified (or otherwise) the main underlying policy 
assumptions.  
 
 
Abstract 
 
The peculiar nature of the US Federal Constitution impinges on the implementation of 
any federal legislation.  The tenth amendment to the US Constitution lays down that 
powers "not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the states, are reserved to the States respectively...."  What this amendment means is 
that political authority is vested in the states unless preempted by the federal 
government.   The most obvious example of federal pre-emption is that of equal rights 
legislation for African Americans.  Such federal action has traditionally come about 
as a result of the perceived failure of states in the civil rights area.  Historically 
environmental issues were the responsibility of the states.  However the emergence of 
the Green movement in the '70s (like the Civil Rights movement of the '60s) has led 
to greater involvement by the federal government. 
 
Nevertheless the role of the states remains central to environmental policy 
implementation and in some cases their legislation has been even stricter than federal 
laws. (Helme & Pearce 1991). 
 
Moreover the constitutional rights of states can be sued to the detriment of federal 
policy.  This allows the states some room for manoeuvre in their dealings with the 
federal government on environmental issues.  This is especially so as full federal pre-
emption, as we shall see, can carry with it unacceptable costs and inadequate levels of 
control. 
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(i) U.S. Environmental Legislation: 
 
 
The Clean Air Act 1955 (CAA): 
 
Amendments in 1970 laid responsibility to the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) for control of emissions by stationery and mobile sources.  Inter alia, the EPA 
was required by law to: 
(a) Establish uniform national ambient air quality standards for specified 
pollutants; 
(b) Limit the maximum amounts of such pollutants that could be emitted by new 
or  expanding/modifying sources; 
(c) Oversee the establishment of State Implementation plans - detailed 
programmes to  control existing sources of pollution in non-attainment areas; 
(d) Draw up a schedule for a decrease over time in the rates of emissions ex motor 
 vehicles. 
 
Further amendments in 1977 created a "two tier" system, whereby those areas of the 
country, which enjoyed air quality in excess of standards, were required to "prevent 
significant deterioration", in other words maintain as far as possible their superior air 
quality. 
 
In 1990 amendments were passed which incorporated two major innovations:- 
(1) Technology-based emissions standards [Maximally Achievable Control 
Technology (MACT)] were required of the EPA for sources of some 200 
specified pollutants.  A strict and precise timetable was laid down for action by 
the EPA. 
(11) Annual emissions of Carbon Dioxide from specified sources were to be cut by 
59% over a 10 year period.  This was the first time that aggregate emissions 
were capped.  Hitherto only rates of emission were regulated.  Emissions 
trading was introduced to minimise the costs of compliance. 
 
The Clean Water Act 1972 (CWA): 
 
Prior to the 1972 individual sources of water pollution were controlled by the 
individual states.  The standards were water based i.e. ambient water quality standards 
were imposed.  This water quality approach was superseded by a technology based 
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system (i.e. effluent standards) under the 1972  Act.  All major sources of water 
pollution were required to install specific technology according to pre-ordained 
deadlines, starting with basic technology and progressing through more advanced 
technology to very sophisticated equipment.  Subsidies were introduced for local 
public bodies affected by the legislation.  These subsidies have since been reduced 
from their initial levels. 
 
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 1972 (FIFRA): 
 
FIFRA was passed in 1972 to regulate the use of pesticides and herbicides on crops.  
This Act differs fundamental from the CAA and CWA inasmuch as it restricts the 
manufacture and use of products rather than residuals of production/use. 
 
Under FIFRA approval by the EPA is required for the introduction of any new 
product or for any proposed new use of an approved product.  The onus of proving 
that a new product/new use will not be hazardous to the environment or to health lies 
with the producer/user.  The EPA can impose restrictions/conditions (including an 
outright ban) on the use of the product depending on the results of mandatory tests. 
 
Existing pesticides/herbicides also came under the aegis of the 1972 Act.  Subject to 
the EPA proving that an unreasonable environmental or health risk is posed by their 
continued manufacture or use, products may be restricted or even banned. 
 
The Safe Drinking Water Act 1974 (SDWA): 
 
This Act required the EPA to set "goals" for the reduction of specified containments 
in drinking water ex public systems.  These are called Recommended Maximum 
Contaminant Levels (RMCLs) and they aspire to provide a certain level of safety for 
consumers.  Binding national regulations for the specified contaminants, called 
Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCLs), have been as near as possible to the RMCLs. 
 
The basic trust of the legislation remains the same today although 1986 amendments 
extended requirements by inter alia the introduction of monitoring of drinking water 
for the presence of  unregulated contaminants, the protection of water sources. 
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The Toxic Substances Control Act 1976 (TSCA): 
 
Like FIFRA the manufacture and use (or the introduction of new uses for approved 
products) of potentially harmful chemicals is regulated.  However TSCA differs from 
FIFRA in one important respect - the burden of proof that the chemicals are hazardous 
falls on the EPA.  The EPA has wide powers of control over a chemical product 
which is proven to be potentially dangerous.  It can control the production, 
transportation, use and disposal of such a product.  It also is empowered to impose the 
ultimate sanction prohibition.  The problem of dealing with pre-existing products is 
similar to that of FIFRA. 
 
The Resource Conversation and Recovery Act 1976 (RCARA): 
 
This Act regulates for the control of the generation, transportation, storage and 
disposal of hazardous and solid-waste (refuse/garbage).  it addresses the problem of 
waste disposal on land in a way that is analogous to the control of environmental 
"wastes" in the air and water.  The Act requires the EPA, among other things, to: 
(1) Define hazardous waste; 
(2) Create a tracking system from generation to disposal of the waste at authorised 
 facilities by approved means 
(3) Regulate handling operations and design requirements for approved facilities; 
(4) Institute rules governing municipal refuse/garbage dumps.  States are given 
wide scope in implementing the rules.  Because of the slow pace at which the 
provisions of the Act were carried out, stringent amendments were introduced in 
1984.  In the absence of the EPA demonstrating that it was unnecessary for 
public safety, a ban was imposed on the land disposal of virtually all hazardous 
waste.  (Again, as with TSCA the onus of proof is with the guardians of the 
environment rather than with the polluters).  The 1976 law was extended to 
include previously unregulated smaller generators/disposers.  However pre-
existing disposers remained unregulated under the original Act.  As a result 
problems soon surfaced which had not been provided for. 
 
The "Superfund "1980: 
 
In 1978 wastes from an abandoned disposal site leaked into basements and yards in 
Buffalo, N.Y.  The need for legislation to respond quickly to such occurrences, to set 
up a fund to compensate the victims and pay for clean-ups, and to define and assign 
liability was particularly pressing as the extent of the potential for such calamities was 
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inestimable.  Such an Act was passed in 1980 and came to be known as the 
"Superfund" after the trust fund which was set up to pay for clean ups. 
 
The "Superfund" would be made up of federal monies augmented by inflows from 
disposers found liable, under the Act, for the damages. 
 
Under the Act, STRICT and JOINT and SEVERAL retroactive liability  are 
controversially imposed.  STRICT liability means that even if a disposer has complied 
with best practices of disposal of the time, he is still liable for the full present day 
clean up costs.  JOINT and SEVERAL liability empowers the EPA to obtain full 
redress from one known  disposers (where there have been several originally 
involved).  It is open to the disposer to recover a proportion of the costs from the other 
disposers (if he can!). 
 
 
(ii) Empirical Validation: 
 
That total pre-emption carries with it unacceptable degrees of cost and control is 
borne out by two actual cases- 
 
(1) In 1981 the Idaho legislature refused to vote funds for the air quality 
programme.  The EPA were forced to administer the programme at a cost five 
times greater than would have been the case with stake implementation. 
 
(2) In 1982 the State of Idaho returned responsibility for its municipal water 
monitoring programme to the federal authorities.  Only 15% of the inspections 
hitherto achieved by the state were carried out by the EPA. 
 
Legal precedent (1970) rules out the use of the threat of fines, sanctions or contempt 
citations to force state implementation of federal environmental policy i.e. the EPA 
cannot use direct coercion. 
 
As direct persuasion is not lawful and as direct intervention (full pre-emption) has 
proved to be costly and inadequate (this latter phenomenon is not unrelated to the 
absence of perfect information already discussed in other modules), alternative forms 
of intervention have had to be explored.  Two possibilities arise, namely "cross-over 
sanctions" and "partial pre-emption" (also called "meet-or-exceed"). 
 
"Cross-over Sanctions: 
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This approach envisages the withholding of federal funding for other state projects as 
a lever to force compliance with environmental requirements.  A precedent exists at 
state level.  In 1977 California Water Resources Board (supported by the State Air 
Resources Board) withheld a federal grant of $10 million for sewage system 
development in Orange County in an attempt to force it to develop a housing policy 
which would reduce the need for commuting thus contributing a reduction in motor 
vehicle emissions. 
 
"Meet-or-Exceed": 
 
This is the principle underlying the CAA (Amendments) 1970, 1977 and 1990.  
Federal authorities set a "floor" (or "ceiling", depending on the perspective) for 
standards.  States may adopt stricter standards but they must, as a minimum, reach the 
"floor".  Emissions trading was introduced to facilitate such an approach with the 
added incentive of minimising costs. 
 
Emissions Trading in the light of experience: 
(1) Estimates put accumulated capital savings at >$10 billion. 
(2) Sources have responded to the increased possibilities for easier compliance. 
(3) Between 7,000 and 12,000 voluntary trades have taken place. 
(4) Only 7 states had established emission banks up to 1986.  This has inhibited the 
supply of ERCs in the "non-banking" states and goes some way to explaining 
why emissions trading has not matched the expectations of its proponents. 
(5) The Emissions Trading Programme has encouraged modest technological 
progress.  While it was expected that the creation of ERCs would be a strong 
incentive to technological innovation, cheaper ways exist for the creation of 
credits i.e. fuel substitution.  However sluggish trading should in the long term 
be a spur to technological investment, otherwise the incentive element of the 
programme will be lost, an undesirable outcome for both regulators and 
polluters. 
(6) Administrative costs have proved to be higher than projected due to regulatory 
intervention in every trade. 
 
SUMMARY: 
 
For Helm and Pearce (1991), the efforts of the USA, through legislation, federal/state 
implementation and adaptation in the light of  experience, demonstrates a very real 
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commitment to the environment.  This commitment is the democratic response to the 
US "green consciousness" of the seventies and onwards.  This contrasts with the 
experience of the Netherlands (see Douthwaite) where both the national political 
demands of the growth imperative and the supra-national dictates of the EU have 
conspired to frustrate the palpable will of the citizens. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the constitutional tensions between federal and state 
rights do not inherently neutralise action.  In fact the commitment of the states is no 
less than that of the federal government.  EPA grants are less than 50% of all states 
expenditure on environmental management, while in the waste disposal area state 
regulations are frequently more stringent. 
Reference: 
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